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Removing Head of State Immunity: Utilizing Domestic Courts to Promote Access to Justice 
Aya Tochigi   
Introduction  
Under old customary international law, a state enjoyed absolute foreign sovereign immunity 
because of the equality among states in the international community.
1
 No state could subject 
another state under its judicial system.  Similar to foreign sovereign immunity, head of state 
immunity was absolute without any exception,
2
 and developed into two types of immunities, 
functional immunity or immunity ratione materiae, and personal immunity or immunity ratione 
personae.
3
   
Functional immunity attaches to the official function of the head of state.
4
 The head of state 
acts on behalf of its state when he performs his official duties, so that the courts cannot hold the 
head of state liable for the state’s act.5 Functional immunity applies to both sitting and former 
heads of state, as long as the acts in question fall under the official function as a head of state.
6
 In 
other words, the head of state has absolute immunity from prosecution when he takes a certain 
actions as his official conduct.  On the other hand, a head of state has personal immunity merely 
because he holds the official status.
 7
 Since personal immunity protects a head of state from civil 
or criminal liability for acts committed under his personal capacity, the personal immunity 
                                                     
1
 Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 
Colum. L. Rev. 169, 170 (1986).  
2
 Mark A. Summers, Immunity or Impunity? The Potential Effect of Prosecutions of State Officials for Core 
International Crimes in States Like the United States That Are Not Parties to the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 31 Brook. J. Int’l L. 463, 466 (2006).  
3
 Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 407, 409-415 
(2004).  
4
 Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts, 
21 Eur. J. Int’l L. 815, 825-28 (2010) [hereinafter Immunities of State Officials].  
5
 Id.   
6
 See 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 407, 412-14. 
7
 Id.  
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disappears once he is no longer the head of state.
8
 Personal immunities developed in order to 
allow state officials, including heads of states, to freely go abroad in order to perform his official 
duties without a fear that his personal conducts may subject himself to another state’s criminal or 
civil liability.
9
  
In the twentieth century, the international community started to recognize exceptions to 
foreign sovereign immunity, such as commercial and tort exceptions.
10
 Similarly, head of state 
immunity has become more restrictive as a trend in the international community.  For example, a 
former head of state may not claim immunity for international crimes in a foreign court.
11
 
Furthermore, various treaties, such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
12
 the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
13
 the New York Convention on Special missions,
14
 
and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment,
15
 prohibit a head of state to invoke functional immunity as a defense.  In addition, 
the Rome Statute,
16
 ICTY Statute,
17
 ICTR Statue,
18
 and other international tribunals’ statutes19 
                                                     
8
 Id.  
9
 Id.  
10
 Jasper Finke, Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?, 21 Eur. J Int’l L. 853, 858-63 (2010).  
11
 Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate And Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000], 
1 A.C. 147 (H.L) (appeal taken from Eng.)[hereinafter Pinochet case]. 
12
 Vienna convention on Diplomatic relations, April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (diplomatic immunity recognized 
without specific mention to head of state immunity).  
13
 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 10, April 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (consular immunity 
recognized without specific mention to head of state immunity).  
14
 Convention on Special Missions art. 21, December 8, 1969, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231 (head of state immunity 
recognized during a special mission in foreign states).  
15
 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85  
(the convention does not recognize officials’ immunities); see Andrea Bianchi, Immunity versus Human Right: The 
Pinochet Case, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L 237, 245(1999) (Pinochet court reasoned that head of state immunity is inconsistent 
with the purpose and object of the Torture Convention).  
16
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 27, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.3 (Nov. 10, 1998) 
[hereinafter Rome Statute].  
17
 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 7, S.C. Res. 
827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827(May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY statute].  
18
 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and other 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Neighboring 
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make it clear that an incumbent position in office does not bar prosecution.  Various domestic 
courts have also tried to indict state officials for international crimes.
20
 These examples show the 
international community’s trend to make the absolute head of state immunity into a restrictive 
one.  However, the immunity still hinders a criminal prosecution of a head of state in a foreign 
state court.  In many cases, heads of states are not prosecuted for international crimes because of 
its difficulty in bringing a case before international courts, thereby they escape criminal liability.  
Therefore, the international community has to resolve an issue of whether an exception to head 
of state immunity may exist in order to prosecute sitting heads to states.   
Arguments have been made to create such an exception when a head of state commits 
international crimes.  One argument states that since the official function of head of state does 
not include violation of jus cogens norm, he does not enjoy immunity.
21
 This argument suggests 
that such an exception exists because a head of state commits an international crime in his 
private capacity.  Another argument, based on Pinochet case, states that a treaty obligation 
prevents a former head of state from enjoying functional immunity when he commits a core 
international crime while he is in office.
22
 This argument also implies that an international crime 
is categorized as a private conduct.  However, at the same time, if an element of the offense 
requires an official function, such as in torture, the court may need to find his act as official in 
order to prosecute him.  Others argue that since head of state immunity gives incentive to heads 
                                                                                                                                                                           
States, between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994 art. 6, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR statute]. 
19
 Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leon art.6(2), S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 4054
th
 mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1270 (1999)[hereinafter Sierra Leon Special Court Statute];  Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea art 29, NS/RKM/1004/006 (Feb. 27, 2003) (amended on October 27, 2004) [hereinafter Extraordinary  
Chambers  Law]. 
20
 See Antonia Casses, When May Senior State Officials be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the 
Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 Eur. J. Int’l. L. 853, 870-71(2002) (state officials were indicted in foreign domestic 
courts in Israel, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, US, Poland, Spain and Mexico).   
21
 Bianchi, supra note 15, at 262; Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992). 
22
 Pinochet case, supra note 11 (international crimes cannot be committed under head of state’s functional capacity). 
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of state to hold office as long as possible when they commit international crimes, such immunity 
should not exist.
23
  In my opinion, all these arguments help to create an exception to absolute 
head of state immunity.  However, none of the above arguments solves the issues of whether 
such an exception to immunity applies regardless of whether a head of state is incumbent or 
former, whether he commits an international crime in his official capacity or private capacity, or 
whether such a distinction is even desirable. 
Under current customary international law, an incumbent head of state has absolute 
immunity regardless of whether his conduct falls under his private or official capacity.  If an 
exception to head of state immunity exists because he violates jus cogens norms in his private 
capacity, a head of state still has functional immunity, which lasts as long as he holds the official 
status.  Therefore, he can be prosecuted only when he leaves the office.  On the other hand, if a 
head of state commits an international crime in his official capacity, his conduct is protected 
under official immunity.  If a commission of an international crime revokes his functional 
immunity, the international community must categorize his act as official.  This shows that such 
a distinction becomes essential when a domestic court deals with the issue of head of state 
immunity.  
This paper will argue that we should not make any distinction between functional or personal 
immunity when a head of state commits international crimes because categorization often poses 
difficult and unsolvable questions.  Part I will show that a distinction between functional and 
personal immunity is vague, and such a distinction allows a responsible head of state to avoid 
criminal liability, as well as the international trend in holding responsible heads of states 
accountable.  Part II will argue that the ICJ decision in Congo v. Belgium does not correctly 
                                                     
23
 Michael A. Tunks, Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-of-State Immunity, 52 Duke L.J. 651, 
656 (2002).  
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reflect the customary international law because various courts have recognized the exception to 
the absolute immunity when the issue involved one of the core international crimes committed 
by a head of state or state officials.  Part III will argue that as a necessity, we need to use 
domestic courts to prosecute heads of state for international crimes because of its accessibility 
and responsiveness compared to international tribunals.  Finally, Part IV will focus on the 
possible risks with removing head of state immunity.  
I. Restrictive Immunity for Head of State Should Prevail Over Absolute Immunity 
Because the Distinction is Meaningless, and the Need for Accountability over Perpetrators 
of International Crimes is Clear 
When a court tries to prosecute a head of state, an issue arises as to whether a head of 
state commits an international crime in his official capacity or personal capacity.  The 
categorization is especially important under current international law because it affects how long 
he may evade prosecution for international crimes.  However, depending on which immunity the 
court is willing to apply, a head of state can label his conduct as official or personal, and 
perpetually avoid criminal prosecution.  This is contrary to the international trend in holding 
perpetrators of international crimes accountable.  By denying this categorization requirement for 
international crimes, the international community will be able to prosecute heads of states 
because they can hide behind neither personal nor functional immunity.   
A. Does a head of state commit a core international crime in his official capacity 
or personal capacity?  
 
Since head of state immunity has two types of immunities, namely functional and personal 
immunity, the characterization of the act by a head of state becomes crucial in deciding whether 
a domestic court applies immunity for his criminal prosecution.   As an internationally leading 
case, the ICJ determined in Congo v. Belgium that the incumbent state official has absolute 
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immunity even when a domestic court indicts him for a core international crime.
24
 The ICJ stated 
categorization of his act as personal or functional does not affect his absolute immunity in 
foreign jurisdictions. 
25
  
This decision triggered the issue of whether a head of state commits a core international 
crime in his official capacity or personal capacity.
26
 Some scholars believe that a head of state 
acts in his private capacity when he commits a core international crime.
27
 They argue that a head 
of state function does not include a violation of jus cogens norms because of its hierarchy in 
international law.
28
 In addition, a head of state does not legitimately act on behalf of his state 
when he commits an international crime
29
 because such an act does not further any of the state’s 
legal objectives.  On the other hand, others disagree to describe that a head of state commits 
international crimes in his private capacity.
30
 They argue that if the head of state acts on behalf of 
the state regardless of its legality, it is an official act; therefore he has the absolute functional 
immunity.
31
 They specifically disagree to characterize international crimes as private because of 
its implication on state liability; if such an act is personal, the state evades a possible liability as a 
state for the international crime because legally it has no involvement in the head of state’s 
commission of the crime.
32
  
Responding to a split in determining an international crime as private or official, scholars 
have tried to suggest ways to resolve the categorization.  Some has considered a distinction 
                                                     
24
 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) [hereinafter Arrest 
Warrant case].  
25
  Id.  at ¶ 58.  
26
 See Akande, Immunities of State Officials, supra note 4; Steffen Wirth, Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s 
Judgment in the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 877, 877(2002).   
27
 Marina Spinedi, State Responsibility v. Individual Responsibility for International Crimes: Tertium Non Datur?, 
13Eur. 895, 898 (2002).  
28
 Bianchi, supra note 15, at 271. 
29
 Salvatore Zappala, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International Crimes? The 
Ghaddafi Case before the French Cour de Cassation, 12 Eur. J, Int’l L. 595, 601 (2001). 
30
 Wirth, supra note 26, at 877; Spinedi, supra note 27, at 897.  
31
 Spinedi, supra note 27, at 897-899. 
32
 Id.  
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between functional and personal ambiguous, so they advocated that the court should look to the 
purpose and means used to commit such an international crime to determine the type of his act.
33
  
Others suggested that because international crimes often include an element of official act, a 
head of state must act in his official capacity in order for a court to prosecute him.
34
 However, 
they also argued that, as a categorical exception to functional immunity, a head of state should 
have no functional immunity when he commits an international crime even though it is classified 
as his official conduct.
35
 Those suggested solutions would not solve the issue because the 
distinction creates a way for the head of state to evade prosecution regardless of which way the 
court decides.  Therefore, we should not be compelled to classify international crime as private 
or official, but grant no immunity to heads of state for international crimes.  
If the international community establishes factors to decide whether the international crime 
committed by a head of state falls under his private or official capacity, the head of state would 
only manipulate to label his acts as private or functional in order to avoid criminal prosecution 
eternally.  On the other hand, establishing a categorical exception to functional immunity 
misunderstands the original meaning of functional immunity.  By deciding that a head of state 
commits an international crime under his official capacity, the international community does not 
recognize his act as an individual act, but that of a state.  It is illogical to prosecute a head of 
state for the act he did not commit as an individual, but rather as a state.  Such a categorical 
exception confuses the distinction between personal and functional immunity.  A sensible 
argument is that a head of state has no immunity for an international crime, not because the 
crime revokes his functional immunity, but because no distinction exists between private and 
official for international crimes.  Therefore, the courts should not categorize whether a head of 
                                                     
33
 Akande, Immunities of State Officials, supra note 4, at 815-852; Casses, supra note 20, at 867–870. 
34
 Akande, Immunities of State Officials, supra note 4, at 815-852.  
35
 Id. at 839-49.  
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state acts in his private or official capacity, but remove the categorization of immunity, and deny 
any immunity when an incumbent head of state commits an international crime.    
B. Opinio juris shows the states’ responsibility to hold heads of state accountable, 
and functional immunity prevents domestic courts from prosecuting heads of state  
The international community agrees that we should hold perpetrators of international 
crimes liable.  As early as the Nuremberg tribunal, the international community has recognized 
accountability of a head of state for international crimes.
36
 The UN General Assembly has also 
approved this proposition.
37
 In Pinochet case, the House of Lords found that General Pinochet, 
who was the head of state of Chile at the time he committed torture, did not have immunity.
38
 
The House of Lords reasoned that because UK has ratified to the Torture Convention, it has to 
uphold the object and purpose of the treaty, which defines torture as an act committed by public 
officials.
39
 Therefore, the Torture Convention obliges signatory states to punish the perpetrator of 
torture.
40
  However, the House of Lords did not clearly indicate whether Pinochet committed 
torture within his official capacity or private capacity, but agreed that as a customary 
international law when an official commits an international crime, he does not have official 
immunity.
41
  
This reasoning has flaws.  By stating that official immunity doesn’t attach with 
international crime, the House of Lords implies that a head of state commits international crimes 
                                                     
36
 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal. London, 8 August 1945 Charter art. 7 (Aug. 8, 1945), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/350?OpenDocument [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]; Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 6 (April 29, 1946), available at http://droitcultures.revues.org/2183#quotation 
[hereinafter Tokyo tribunal statute]. 
37
 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. 
Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/236, at 1144 (1946) [hereinafter Affirmation by GA]. 
38 
Pinochet case, supra note 11. 
39
 Id.  
40
 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 4, Dec. 10, 
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].  
41
 Bianchi, supra note 15, at 249.  
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in his private capacity.
42
 However, one element of torture requires that an official commits the 
act of torture.
43
 The definition suggests that an official involvement is required in order to 
establish a head of state committed torture.
 44
 Therefore, categorizing his act as private weakens 
the existence of torture as defined by the Torture Convention because Pinochet could argue that 
no official involvement occurred because his act was done under his personal capacity.  As stated 
above, some argued that such a flaw impacts not only on the prosecution of heads of states but 
also on holding a state responsible for violation of international law because if the act is private, 
such an act does not implicate state responsibility.
45
 In that scenario, both a head of state and his 
state evade international responsibility.  
However, this argument is misleading because no correlation exists between the 
categorization of the act as personal or functional, and whether the state can be held liable.  The 
ICJ recently decided that sovereign immunity applies to a domestic court even though the 
underlying offense arguably violated jus cogens norms in Germany v. Italy.
46
 The victims of the 
WWII in Italy brought a civil suit against Germany for compensation for forced labor and other 
international crimes.
47
 Germany claimed that it has foreign sovereign immunity, and no 
exception to state immunity exists for jus cogens norms violation.
48
 The ICJ accepted Germany’s 
claim because it found no customary international law, in which a state loses its sovereign 
immunity because the state violates jus cogens norms.
49
 However, the Court added that the 
decision does not affect customary international law on head of state immunity as seen in 
                                                     
42
 Pinochet case, supra note 11, at 897. 
43
 Torture Convention, supra note 40.  
44
 See also Wirth, supra note 26, at 891. 
45
 Id.  
46
 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), 2012 I.C.J. 1(Feb. 3).  
47
 Id. 
48
 Id.  
49
 Id.  
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Pinochet case.
50
  This opinion shows that regardless of whether the responsible head of state has 
functional or personal immunity, under the current international law, such a categorization does 
not affect the fact that states are immune from civil liability in a foreign court.  In other words, 
even if Pinochet has acted in his private capacity in committing torture, the victims of torture 
cannot sue Chile for damages in foreign courts.  At the same time, decision on the state liability 
does not affect the head of state’s responsibility for international crimes because state sovereign 
rules differ from head of state immunity rules.  
Sovereign immunity developed different exceptions over years from head of state 
immunity.
51
 A state does not have criminal liability because it is not an individual, although 
some civil law states allow victims to bring a claim for damages in criminal proceedings.
52
 If a 
head of state commits an international crime by utilizing the state’s army or taking advantage of 
his official status, the state should be held accountable for its action, if jurisdictional 
requirements are met.  As a recent example, Yugoslavia (Serbia) was found liable in failing to 
prevent and punish genocide in accordance with the Genocide Convention,
53
 while the ICTY 
indicted Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević for crimes against humanity and war crimes 
arising from the same war.
54
 The fact that the ICTY statute had to specifically deny official 
                                                     
50
 Id.  
51
 Joanne Foakes and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, State Immunity: the United Nations Convention and Its Effect, 
International Law Programme, Chatham House (May 2005), 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/bpstateimmunity.pdf; United 
Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, Annex, U.N. 
GAOR,59
th
 Sess. Supp. No. 49, U.N.Doc. A/59/49 (Dec. 2, 2004) (not in effect yet).  
52
 Foakes, supra note 51, at ¶ 30.  
53
 Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & 
Montenegro), 1996 I.C.J. 595, ¶¶ 219-29 (July 11); Marko Milanović, State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-
Up, 18 Eur. J. Int’l L. 669, 670 (2007); Mark Toufayan, The World Court's Distress When Facing Genocide: A 
Critical Commentary on the Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro)), 40 Tex. Int'l L.J. 233, 249 (2005).  
54
 Press Release, ICTY, President Milosevic and Four Other Senior Fry Officials Indicted for Murder, Persecution 
and Deportation in Kosovo, JL/PIU/403-E (May 27, 1999), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7765.  
11 
 
immunity in criminal proceedings further suggests that the categorization of functional or 
personal immunity and the trend to hold the perpetrator accountable are in conflict.
55
    
In addition, categorizing international crimes as official or private act hinders the access 
to justice.  Although the ICJ in Congo v. Belgium emphasized that immunity does not amount to 
impunity,
56
 situations will exist where the immunity will mean impunity.  In fact, if a domestic 
court may not prosecute a head of state because of his immunity, he will never be prosecuted 
unless the ICC has jurisdiction over the case, or the UN establishes an international tribunal to 
specifically prosecute him and other officials.  As the House of Lords correctly decided in 
Pinochet case,
57
 so long as the state is a signatory to a treaty which doesn’t recognize immunity 
as a defense, the state has an obligation not to offend the object and purpose of the treaty.
58
 
When the treaty obliges state parties to prosecute or punish certain international crimes, they 
have to uphold such an obligation.
59
 Although the ICJ cautioned that such treaties do not affect 
customary international law on immunity,
60
states have a duty to prosecute those who commit 
international crimes under the treaties to which they signed on.  In fact, “approximately seventy 
international criminal conventions” impose such an obligation to party states, including “the 
Genocide Convention, the Convention against Torture, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, American Convention on Human Rights, and the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”61  
                                                     
55
 See also Ellen L. Lutz & Caitlin Reiger, Prosecuting Heads of State,15 (1st ed. Cambridge University Press 2009) 
(European countries, Latin America, Asia and African countries have held heads of state accountable for atrocities.).  
56
 Arrest Warrant case, supra note 24, at ¶ 48.  
57
 Pinochet case, supra note 11 (“As required by the Torture Convention ‘all’ torture wherever committed world-
wide was made criminal under United Kingdom law and triable in the United Kingdom”).  
58
 Vienna Convention Law of Treaties art 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  
59
 Id.  
60
 Arrest Warrant case, supra note 24, ¶59. 
61
 Masaya Uchino, Prosecuting Heads of State: Evolving Questions of Venue - Where, How, and Why?, 34 Hastings 
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 341, 344 (2011); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human 
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 Yale L.J. 2537, 2562- 2582 (1991). 
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The need for accountability is clear, and it is the opinio juris that those who are 
responsible for committing international crime should be prosecuted.  For example, if lower 
ranking officials without recognized functional or personal immunity acts in accordance with the 
order by the head of state, he will be prosecuted regardless of whether he is has an official title or 
not.  However, by categorizing such acts as functional, the head of state can never be prosecuted 
unless some exceptions apply.  This shows that such a categorization does not contribute in 
holding responsible heads of state accountable for international crimes.  
The International Law Commission (ILC), for the first time in 2007, decided to address 
the issues concerning state officials.
62
 In the third resolution, the ILC acknowledged that 
contradiction exists between human rights and immunities.
63
 While the ILC seems to take the 
position to accord absolute incumbent head of state immunity, it recognizes that other states may 
provide access to justice, which would necessarily include prosecution of a head of state, if he is 
responsible for the international crime.
64
 The ILC also recognizes that a state has responsibility 
not to let immunity be an obstacle for victims to have an access to justice.
65
 If the goal of the 
international community is to hold heads of states responsible for international crime, this 
categorization becomes a barrier.  Therefore, the international community should not try to 
categorize the acts of the head of state when it is core international crime whether it is personal 
or functional.   
II. The ICJ case, Congo v. Belgium, Did Not Correctly Reflect the Customary 
International Law by Denying Any Existence of Exceptions to Absolute Immunity for 
Incumbent Head of State 
                                                     
62
 Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 62/66, Sixty sixth Sess., Supp. No. 10, 
U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (5 May to 6 June and 7 July to 8 August 2008) (final resolution is still in progress).  
63
 Zdzislaw Galicki, Special Rapporteur, Third report on the obligation to extradite or prosecute, G.A. Res. 60, 
Sixtieth Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/603 (May to 6 June and 7 July to 8 August 2008).  
64
 Annyssa Bellal, The 2009 Resolution of the Institute of International Law on Immunity and International Crimes, 
9 J. Int’tl Crim. Just. 227, 231 (2011); Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, supra note 62.  
65
 Bellal, supra note 64, at 235.  
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In 2000, Belgium issued an arrest warrant against Yerodia, who at the time was an 
incumbent state official, for grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and the additional 
protocols, and crimes against humanity.
66
 Congo claimed that Belgium violated international law 
by failing to refuse to prosecute an incumbent state official, and brought a claim against Belgium 
in ICJ.
67
 Belgium claimed that state officials do not have immunity when the crimes in issue 
constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity.
68
 The ICJ rejected Belgium’s claim and found 
that Belgium violated international law because no customary international can be deduced to 
deny incumbent state official’s immunity,69 although various cases below suggest the existence 
of such an exception.  
The ICJ erroneously determined that exceptions to immunity applied by the international 
tribunals do not affect the status of customary international law on domestic courts.
70
 As 
mentioned above, various treaties waive head of state immunity for international crimes.  The 
Nuremberg statute
71
 and the Tokyo tribunal statues
72
 do not acknowledge official status as a bar 
to prosecute the perpetrators.  As the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals are often cited as one of 
the first international tribunals to prosecute international crimes,
73
 the statutes have significance 
in developing customary international law on the issue of immunity.   
Even if not much state practice exists in removing the immunity of the sitting head of 
state, the UN General Assembly has confirmed the existence of opinio juris by confirming the 
proposition made by the Nuremberg Charter, which recognized accountability for international 
                                                     
66
 Arrest Warrant case, supra note 24, at 123.  
67
 Id.  
68
 Id.  
69
 Id., at 145. 
70
 Id., at ¶59. 
71
 Nuremberg Charter, supra note 36. 
72
 Tokyo tribunal statute, supra note 36.  
73
 Beth Van Schaack & Ronald C. Slye, International Criminal Law and Its Enforcement, 29-30 (2nd ed. Thompson 
Reuters, 2010).  
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crimes committed by state officials.
74
 The fact that various statues of international tribunals 
repeatedly include such language reinforces that the international community as a whole has 
accepted this notion of removing incumbent head of state immunity for atrocities.
75
 As the ICJ 
statute considers the conventions and judicial decisions as the source of international law,
76
 these 
above mentioned statutes should be regarded as an emerging trend in international law to remove 
head of state immunity for international crimes.   
Various practices by international courts further affirm this emerging international law.  
Special Court for Sierra Leon indicted Charles Taylor, the sitting head of state of Liberia, for an 
international crime he allegedly committed during the Sierra Leon Civil War.
77
 The Special 
Court for Sierra Leon rejected Taylor’s defense on absolute immunity from criminal liability.78 
The Court relied on the fact that the Special Court for Sierra Leon is regarded as international 
court because it is backed by the UN, and the Security Council was involved in establishing the 
tribunal.
79
 Therefore, Congo v. Belgium didn’t control this case since the ICJ case does not stand 
for the proposition that international tribunals may not remove incumbent head of state’s 
absolute immunity.
80
 Furthermore, the ICC has issued arrest warrants against Al-Bashir, 
President of Sudan, for crimes against humanity and genocide.
81
 Article 27 of the Rome statute 
specifically denies immunity as a defense.
82
 Although all of the above statutes and cases involve 
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international tribunals, these practices are the evidence that the international community should 
hold a head of state accountable for international crimes.   
In fact, although without success, in 2001, the French court tried to use its domestic court 
to prosecute a head of state; the court indicted Qaddafi, who at the time was arguably the Head 
of State of Libya, for the bombing of the UTA ariliner.
83
 The victims of the bombing and an 
NGO made a complaint to indict Qaddafi to the Chambers Court, as allowed under the French 
system.
84
 The Court eventually granted immunity to Qaddafi and dismissed the indictment 
because it did not regard terrorism as an international crime.
85
 This reasoning suggests that the 
Court might have applied an exception to the head of state immunity if the underlying crime 
constituted one of the core international crimes as stated in the ICC statute.
86
 Therefore, although 
not much state practice exists, enough evidence shows that a head of state should not be able to 
claim immunity when prosecuted for core international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.   
III. Domestic Courts Provide the Best Platforms for Victims to Seek Access to Justice in 
Prosecuting a Head of State, Rather Than International Tribunals 
 
Difficulties exist in bringing cases before the international tribunals, such as the ICC. 
One of the problems is that prosecution starts only well after the commission of the international 
crime.
87
 In contrary, domestic courts have the ability to respond to human rights crisis more 
quickly because they do not need any UN involvement in establish a new international tribunal, 
such as ICTY and ICTR.  In addition, the procedural and jurisdictional requirements under the 
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international tribunals make it difficult for the victims to have an access to justice, and thereby 
making domestic courts a more attractive option to seek justice.   
A. The domestic courts respond to hold crimes accountable more quickly than 
international tribunals 
 
The ICC issued an arrest warrant against Al-Bashir, President of Sudan, in 2009 and in 
2010, even though the alleged crime was committed in 2003.
88
 Similarly, it took five years for 
the ICC to issue an arrest warrant against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, President and Commander 
in Chief of the Mouvement de liberation du Congo (MLC) for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed from 2002 to 2003 in Central African Republic.
89
 Furthermore, the ICC 
issued an arrest warrant against Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, current Minister of 
National Defence in Sudan in 2012 for crimes allegedly committed from 2002 to 2003.90  
Although the ICC was responsive in issuing arrest warrants against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, de 
Facto Libyan Prime Minister, and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Colonel in the Libyan Armed Forces 
and current head of the Military Intelligence for crimes allegedly committed in 2010,
91
 generally 
the ICC does not promptly hold perpetrators accountable for international crimes.  In comparison, 
in 2000 Belgium issued an indictment of Yerodia, at the time sitting Minister for Foreign Affairs 
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of Congo, for his involvement in publicly encouraging the Congolese to kill Tutsis in 1998.
92
 
Although not many state courts have prosecuted heads of states, considering the slowness of the 
ICC’s procedure in issuing arrest warrants against state officials for international crimes, we 
have a necessity in utilizing domestic courts in order to prosecute responsible heads of states.   
Even with the development of international tribunals, domestic courts have an important 
role in prosecuting international crimes.
93
 For example, when Belgium enacted universal 
jurisdiction statute, which allowed “victims to file complaints… for atrocities committed 
abroad,”94 victims filed various complaints against heads of states.95 In addition, a state court, 
although his own state, prosecuted Alberto Fujimori, former Peruvian President for atrocities he 
committed during his incumbency.
96
 These examples show that domestic courts are equipped 
with prosecuting heads of state, although this does not reject the existence of international 
tribunals.  International courts are suitable platforms to prosecute heads of states or other state 
officials because risks with prosecuting a head of state in domestic courts, mentioned below in 
Part IV, are minimized.  Also, the judges serving for the international tribunals include those 
who have expertise in international law.  Therefore, they apply the international law more 
appropriately than judges in domestic courts do.  Nevertheless, we should use domestic courts 
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more often to prosecute heads of states, as Lord Millet in Pinochet case predicts,
97
 because of 
accessibility and responsiveness.  
B. International tribunals’ underlying requirements to bring cases make the 
domestic courts more attractive because of its simpler structure  
 
In order for the ICC to have jurisdiction, the states must be parties to the Rome Statute.
98
  
As of now, about 60% of the UN member states are state parties to the Rome Statute.
99
 However, 
many states including the U.S., India, and China are not parties to the Rome Statute yet.
100
 
Therefore, the ICC has geographically limited jurisdictions as well as other limitations.  The ICC 
obtains jurisdiction over cases when states are unwilling or unable to prosecute the perpetrator of 
international crimes.
101
 The UN Security Council may also refer cases under its Chapter VII 
power.
102
 However, the requirement of complementarity suggests that the ICC defers to the 
criminal proceedings in the domestic courts.
103
 In addition, ad hoc international tribunals, such as 
ICTY and ICTR, are criticized as costly and time consuming because of its “cumbersome 
bureaucratic structure.”104 Furthermore, in establishing such an ad hoc tribunal, if conducted 
through the Security Council’s Chapter VII power, political issues will be deeply involved 
because of the permanent members’ veto powers.105  
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All the requirements with the ICC jurisdiction as well as difficulty in establishing ad hoc 
tribunals necessitates the international community to rely on domestic courts in order to 
prosecute responsible heads of states for international crimes.  Therefore, in prosecuting heads of 
states for international crimes, the international community should not use only the international 
tribunals, but utilize state courts because they have the ability to respond to cases more quickly 
and have simpler jurisdictional requirements than the international tribunals. 
IV. Possible Risks in Removing the Distinction between Functional and Personal 
Immunity for International Crimes, thereby Making It Possible to Prosecute the 
Incumbent Head of State 
 
Applying restrictive head of state immunity leads to several possible downsides.  Risks 
include undermining the status of the state within the international community, as well as a 
powerful state’s improper influence on the other state’s political system or independence.  In 
contrast, international tribunals, including hybrid tribunals, arguably do not impose such risks 
because of their status as international courts.  However, observing the examples of hybrid 
tribunals, domestic courts will also work as a platform to prosecute heads of states.  Furthermore, 
the issue of political influence is not foreign to the international tribunals.  Moreover, above 
listed risks also exist in other areas of international law.  A comparison with the development of 
humanitarian law will confirm that removing head of state immunity facilitate further progress in 
holding responsible individuals accountable for international crimes, and promote justice in the 
international community.  
A. Equality among states; comparison between state courts and hybrid 
tribunals 
Because of his unique position as a head of state, removing his immunity may interfere 
with sovereignty.  As the concept of state sovereign immunity underlies head of state immunity, 
20 
 
a head of state could not have been distinguished from the state in the old customary 
international law.
106
 Judge de Cara in Congo v. France opined in her dissenting opinion that 
since a head of state in Africa specifically represents “ethnic solidarity,” removing his immunity 
would affect his presence in the international community.
107
 In addition, she stated that even if 
head of state immunity can be removed, he would merely avoid going to other states, including 
his enemy state, in order not to be arrested, so that such removal of immunity would hinder states 
to have peace talks.
108
 Therefore, an effort to prosecute a head of state in a state court would only 
degrade the status of himself and his state in the international community, without actually 
holding him accountable.  On the contrary, since the international tribunals are established by the 
UN or a treaty between a hosting state and the UN, the prosecution of a head of state in the 
international tribunals would not degrade the state’s status in the international community.   In 
other words, prosecuting a head of state in international tribunals does not offend the notion of 
equality between states, since no state subjects another state to its law.  
Following this argument, hybrid tribunals also should not offend such a notion of equality 
among states since they are international tribunals.  However, not all the “international tribunals,” 
including the Special Court for Sierra Leon, are purely international in its nature.  Although the 
Special Court for Sierra Leon decided that it is an international tribunal, it was not specifically 
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established by the Security Council’s Chapter VII power.109 Notably, its statues do not specify 
that only the head of state of the hosting state can be prosecuted, but deny all head of state 
immunity as a bar to a prosecution.
110
  
In fact, the Special Court for Sierra Leon indicted Charles Taylor, incumbent President of 
Liberia.
111
 If Sierra Leon’s domestic court is competent, it should be able to prosecute Charles 
Taylor as well without having to grant him immunity.  However, a state court would have to 
grant immunity following the ICJ decision in Congo v. Belgium.
112
 It is irrational to require 
Sierra Leon’s domestic court to grant Charles Taylor immunity, but not with the Special Court 
for Sierra Leon, when the Special Court for Sierra Leon was created specifically to prosecute 
those who are responsible for the international crimes committed during its civil war, which 
affected Sierra Leon, and not the whole international community.  Merely because the UN 
involved in establishing the ad hoc tribunal, the nature of the offenses committed by Charles 
Taylor does not change.  Regardless of the UN involvement, when the international crimes 
committed by a head of state affects another state, at least the affected state should be able to 
prosecute him without granting immunity.  
In addition, it is not rare for a head of state to be involved in international crimes committed 
in another state.  For example, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, President of the Mouvement de 
libération du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of Congo) (MLC), allegedly committed 
crimes against humanity and war crimes in Central African Republic during 2002 to 2003.
113
 If 
the UN established a hybrid tribunal in Central African Republic in order to prosecute those who 
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committed the international crimes during the time, it would have jurisdiction over Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, even though he is a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
President of MLC.  Such a criminal proceeding would arguably degrade the status of Congo or 
MLC, according to the argument made by Judge de Cara in Congo v. France.  However, if the 
statute of such a hybrid tribunal does not recognize his official status as a defense, the ad hoc 
court will be able to prosecute him.   
Although a domestic court is fundamentally different from hybrid tribunals because the 
international community has no direct involvement in establishing each state’s judicial system, 
the international community cannot only rely on hybrid courts as mentioned in Part III.  Hybrid 
courts often has jurisdiction over only specific individuals and incidents.  In addition, 
establishing hybrid tribunals is extremely costly.
114
 At the same time, a hybrid court often 
incorporates domestic law,
115
 and includes domestic judges,
116
 therefore has similarities to 
domestic courts.  If a hybrid tribunal may prosecute heads of states different from a hosting state, 
a domestic court, if equipped to apply international law and has jurisdiction over the case, should 
be able to prosecute them also.   
Furthermore, the prosecution does not necessarily deny equality among states unless the 
prosecuting state tries to apply its domestic law extraterritorially.  Although this paper will not 
discuss the controversy over universal jurisdiction, the concept of universal jurisdiction supports 
removing head of state immunity.  Universal jurisdiction stems from the idea that certain 
atrocities are so egregious that they affect the whole international community.
117
 By utilizing 
universal jurisdiction, each state may hold those who committed international crimes 
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accountable.
118
 Under the universal jurisdiction, each state has equal power to prosecute those 
who committed jus cogens norms violation.  Therefore, a prosecuting state does not subdue the 
state to which the prosecuted head of state belongs, but merely exercises what is allowed under 
the international law.  As long as the concept of universal jurisdiction exists, domestic courts 
should be able to utilize it when the head of state committed atrocities.
119
  
B. Political influence exists in prosecution by both domestic and international 
tribunals, therefore this risk should not prevent a domestic court from prosecuting a 
head of state 
Political influence is probably one of the biggest problems with the prosecuting state 
officials including a head of state in a domestic court.  Because of such political influence, a 
prosecuting state may hesitate to remove head of state immunity, or a prosecuting state may 
manipulate another state’s political system, judicial system or economy.  For example, when 
Iraqi citizens filed criminal complaints against George H.W. Bush, former U.S. President, Dick 
Cheney, former U.S. vice president, and other officials, in the Belgium court for international 
crimes, the US warned Belgium that they would “pull NATO headquarters out of Brussels unless 
the law was changed.”120 Responding to the threat, Belgium amended the universal jurisdiction 
law to more restrictive law with some procedural requirements, so that they could not prosecute 
heads of states that easily anymore.
121
 On the other hand, a prosecution against Hissene Habré, 
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former head of state of Chad, in the Belgium Court still continues.
122
 It is not to suggest that 
Belgium is improperly influencing Chad’s governmental or political system, but as a possibility, 
Belgium may trade revocation of an arrest warrant for something in return, thereby exploit 
Chad’s resources or adjusts its political structure to Belgium’s advantage.  Although this issue 
has broader implication than removal of head of state immunity, international community may 
disagree with removing head of state immunity because of the political influence issues.   
 However, such political influence happens in international courts as well.  Because of the 
limited jurisdiction of the ICC, heads of politically powerful states will probably not be 
prosecuted.  Besides the fact that several of the permanent members in the Security Council have 
not been state parties to the Rome statute,
123
 the Security Council will not refer a case to the ICC 
if the case involves their states.  Similarly, the Security Council will not establish an ad hoc 
tribunal if the international crimes were committed by their heads of states, as shown with the 
US example above.  In that case, domestic courts will be the only alternative jurisdiction to 
prosecute responsible heads of state, if the prosecuting state can resist such political influence.  
Therefore, political influence should not hinder utilizing domestic courts to prosecute heads of 
state.  
C. Comparison with Humanitarian Intervention  
The core idea of removing head of state immunity and humanitarian intervention overlaps 
because both provide a possible solution in preventing atrocities in the international community.  
With removing head of state immunity, the international community may indirectly intervene in 
a humanitarian crisis in another state because, if a head of state plans or orders such atrocities 
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within his state, the source of the atrocities may be physically removed from the state because of 
the arrest and prosecution.    
Comparatively, although the same risks of sovereignty and political influence exist in 
humanitarian intervention, “a responsibility to protect (R2P)” has been recognized as part of the 
international law.
124
 Similarly, a state may use humanitarian intervention as a pretext to engage 
in a war or to change the political regime of a particular state,
125
 but the responsibility to protect 
in humanitarian intervention context imposes each state the responsibility over its citizens.
126
 
When the state fails to uphold its responsibility, the international community may intervene.
127
 
The risk does not justify invalidating grounds for humanitarian intervention because the 
international trend is to prevent international crimes.
128
 Similarly, as the ICJ acknowledged that a 
state may prosecute its own head of state,
129
 when the state fails to do so, the international 
community should step in to prosecute him.  Necessity is suggested as one of the justifications of 
humanitarian intervention.
130
 If the government of the head of state is not willing to prosecute 
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him, and international tribunals do not have jurisdiction, the victims of such atrocities should be 
able to rely on other foreign courts since their rights to access to justice should be absolute.
131
   
Furthermore, states have another option of humanitarian intervention without force if 
head of state immunity is removed.  Since the state would not need the Security Council 
authorization or later approval for use of force,
132
 states will be less hesitant in intervening to the 
crisis by a means of criminal prosecution.  As shown in Kosovo and Rwanda, the international 
community has continuously failed to intervene when a state needs the international 
community’s help.133 As evidenced by the current situation in Syria, the UN Security Council 
can be paralyzed even when the international community recognizes the existence of human 
rights violation.
134
 Since the UN has already vocalized its concern over Syrian government 
authority’s involvement in crimes against humanity in Syria, if a foreign state could indict those 
state officials without hindrance of immunity, a possibility exists in stopping such international 
crimes at an early stage.
135
 Therefore, although risks in removing head of state immunity exist, 
considering the international trend in holding responsible heads of state accountable, such risks 
should not justify them to continue having the immunity.   
Conclusion  
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 The international community has recognized head of state immunity as absolute for a 
very long time since the origin of such immunity.  However, with the development of 
international crimes, the community also has developed opinio juris in holding perpetrators 
accountable.  The international tribunals have, in fact, have prosecuted a number of heads of 
state by denying their immunity.  Although immunity should not mean impunity, heads of states 
still practically enjoy impunity because of the notion of functional and personal immunity.  This 
requirement of categorizing international crime committed by a head of state as private or 
functional allows him to possibly evade criminal prosecution forever.  Since this categorization 
is vague, and does not promote bringing justice to the international community, we should 
eliminate this categorization requirement when a head of state commits an international crime.  
Since, often times, the international tribunals are not responsive in prosecuting 
responsible heads of states for international crimes because of its procedural and jurisdictional 
requirements, as a necessity, we need to utilize domestic courts to prosecute heads of states.  
Looking at the prosecution of heads of states and other officials in hybrid tribunals, which had 
similarities with domestic courts, the international community should trust domestic courts’ 
ability in handling the same cases.  Although removing head of state immunity does bring risks 
of degrading the state’s status and political influence, we should prosecute heads of states in 
domestic courts, and further develop the trend of holding perpetrators of international crimes 
accountable.  We can achieve this goal by not categorizing a head of state’s act as private or 
functional, and remove all immunity when he commits an international crime.  
